Nietzsche’s philosopher, this does not surprise us, is supposed to be a man, just as Bataille’s reader is supposed to be a man.

Women, if they are reading at all take all this and more in stride: making allowances for and reading and seeing from a man’s perspective. Women are, as de Beauvoir reminds us, uncannily good at this: an oppressed group dispersed among the oppressors, an oppressed group that takes the perspective of the oppressor and thus sidesteps any chance at the dialectic, subversion, revolution, and not at all coincidentally, excludes anything like consciousness or awareness.

women are not a minority, like the American Negroes or the Jews; there are as many women as men on earth. Again, the two groups concerned have often been originally independent; they may have been formerly unaware of each other’s existence, or perhaps they recognised each other’s autonomy. But a historical event has resulted in the subjugation of the weaker by the stronger. The scattering of the Jews, the introduction of slavery into America, the conquests of imperialism are examples in point. In these cases the oppressed retained at least the memory of former days; they possessed in common a past, a tradition, sometimes a religion or a culture. -- Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex

Proletarians say ‘We’; Negroes also. Regarding themselves as subjects, they transform the bourgeois, the whites, into ‘others’. But women do not say ‘We’, except at some congress of feminists or similar formal demonstration; men say ‘women’, and women use the same word in referring to themselves. They do not authentically assume a subjective attitude.-- Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex

Perhaps the problem is, as Nietzsche complains with uncanny insight in his The Gay Science when he speaks of the tendency of women to play at being themselves, playing the role of the image of themselves, for men, even intimately, especially intimately. The problem, as Nietzsche sees it is that they play themselves as and for the subject that they do not opt themselves to be but instead Das sie sich hingeben, that they play-act at yielding or giving themselves, even when they “yield themselves.”

See for further discussion, Babich, “Nietzsche and Eros Between the Devil and God’s Deep Blue Sea: The Erotic Valence of Art and the Artist as Actor — Jew — Woman,” Continental Philosophy Review, 33 (2000): 159-188. Link here to ->->>Fulltext.

Voir aussi: « Nietzsche et Eros entre le gouffre de Charybde et l’écueil de Dieu: La valence érotique de l’art et l’artiste comme acteur — Juif — Femme. » Trad. De Isabelle Wienand. Revue Internationale de Philosophie. 211/1 (2000): 15-55.




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The ‘Will to Truth’ -- and Woman

Nietzsche apotheosizes the ‘will to truth’ counter our purer expectations as the will not to be deceived, thus he connects truth with a woman, exposing the desire for truth as a desire like any other.



Thus Nietzsche asks “What really is it in us that wants ‘the truth’?” and carries the erotic resonance of the question to the issue of questioning as such, reminding us, fully cognizant of the invocation of the sphinx, of Oedipus who himself searched himself, taking counsel from no one and after winning his fortune, finally found his own fatal answer to the question, “Who really is it here who questions us?”

In an examination of conscience drawn from Kant’s moral philosophy and thence conveyed to Freud via Nietzsche himself as the locus of the unconscious in us, we can never know if it is “the question concerning the problem of the value of truth” that steps before us, or if we ourselves all-too-unknowingly have “stepped before this problem? Which of us is Oedipus here? Which of us Sphinx?” (BGE §1)

Supposing, what if, truth were a woman?

Nietzsche's supposition is provocative and a great deal of winking and no small amount of feminist preening has been expended in reaction. As such, however, Nietzsche’s question reveals less about the femininity of truth than the masculinity of its seekers.

Thus with Nietzsche’s contention that truth be regarded as a woman one has no choice but to bring a case against the suitors of or aspirants to truth and that is the point we need to make, and yet and always forget to make — and as soon as this lecture is over, for some of us already and even now, we are back to thinking as we usually do, which means that we are back to taking the standard reader’s view, the standard thinker’s view, which is of course thoroughly sexed as Nietzsche reminds us: “all philosophers, when they have been dogmatists” prove themselves both male and incompetent.

Philosophers to a man, all of truth's suitors, have been way too, all too clumsy.

Nietzsche’s philosopher, this does not surprise us, is supposed to be a man, just as Bataille’s reader is supposed to be a man.

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In Bataille, as in Sade, as in Lacan, what fascinates us is only talk...

And of course, or probably, no theorist "gets this point," after Bataille, that is
to say, after Lacan himself that is, better than Žižek.

Squared.

What fascinates us is only talk.  

Again: in Bataille, as in Sade, as in Lacan, and this Žižek exploits to a degree that is now marvelously well-known, what fascinates us is only talk, the very idea of the very idea...  With Bataille we speak explicitly  (this is to say: directly) of things Nietzsche only expresses with allusion to ancient mysteries.
In other words, Bataille eroticizes Nietzsche.

Not that Nietzsche lacks his share, assuming there is always such.... 

(and just this when it comes to the gentlemen is rather problematic to assume) ...

Still, still and despite the
fact that men, heterosexually disposed do not regard themselves as objects for women, for the other, to be assessed and judged and so on, Nietzsche has been eroticized, posthumously, a tad homoerotically (for this changes nothing of the above heteroerotic point), and ergo falsified, including, when imposed on his person a certain phallicization, rather as if, certainly this would have been true, Nietzsche were not nearly muscular enough for our fantasies for him.

In this case, the metonymy of the image, despite its profoundly erroneous dimensions, speaks to us: in Nietzsche not as the Übermensch but as "superman" in the 1907 bookplate by Alfred Soder for Friedrich Berthold Sutter, Der nackte Nietzsche im Hochgebirge, which also has been featured as the cover for one key book on Nietzsche and his overall historical reception not to mention blogs and Facebook pages.  

This has also been done more conventionally not with Nietzsche himself but still more from the viewpoint of the subject as such for whom an object, this would be truth, or life, or eternity as Nietzsche also personalizes this speaks to us.  

Thus I am reminded of a the cover of a Hollingdale translation depicting the Sphinx not in stone but in, as it were, soft-porn, almost Vargas girl detail with the one key exception that the sphinx, being a sphinx, was not smiling, lacked a Vargas-girl cream complexion (to the middle-Eastern contrary) and had lidded eyes rather than open, inviting eyes.

 “Supposing truth to be a woman — what then? Is the suspicion not well founded that all philosophers, when they have been dogmatists, have had little understanding of women?” (BGE, Preface)

NB
-- because it has to be said --
the reference to a "Vargas girl" is to the Peruvian artist, Alberto Vargas (9 February 1896 – 30 December 1982), and not, and this not is here fairly significant, to the sixties 'chanteuse,' Chavela Vargas (b. 1911) ...

Where Vargas girls are rather like Frank Frazetta men (nb, again, and always, not boys, and note that Frazetta, for his own part, does a mean Alberto Vargas), Chavela Vargas --- who set the pattern in many ways for k.d. lang, if and to be sure hailing as she does from the Mexico south of the US much rather than the Canada north of the US.



Where, as Nietzsche reminds us, the south always is far more threatening, more dangerous (Goethe knew this), this also means, alas, that we tend not to take account of it.

Alberto Vargas offers us an iconic pattern, echoing so many others who had done so already with the cello and its form, and its voice, sexualizing the outline of the guitar.



And, indeed, Chavela Vargas herself repeats this image.

Chavela Vargas went from the (in retrospect) amazingly easy-to-do, as in not really all that, after all, mindfuck of gendercossings in the sixties to the greatest of transgressions, getting old and singing old, all a challenge to the image of the Dionysian vitality of music.

Aging is the thing, as Nietzsche also reminded us, that counts for us as an offense against our metaphysical dreams, as aging, like, becoming, procreation, death is what life is.





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Nietzsche apotheosizes the ‘will to truth’ counter our purer expectations as the will not to be deceived, thus he connects truth with a woman, exposing the desire for truth as a desire like any other.

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This, like, Sade, is literature not practice to repeat a point (or was it a defense?) that David Allison is fond of offering on Sade’s behalf in contrast to the 15th century Gilles de Rais, a criminal virtuoso of excess and transgression arguably beyond Sade’s or even Bataille’s wildest adventures. See Bataille, The Trial of Gilles de Rais

But this is only because we know, because he was a wealthy man and servants talk. There is a world of unchronicled crime, but we should not call it crime, as Nietzsche reminds us: for the practitioner it is only a sin in the consciousness of the same.

One needs to think of it as such.

Who notices the ants one crushes, the gnats one brushes away?

But in the case of eros, consciousness dissolves and returns upon itself, can almost catch iself in the act, horror, edge, frisson.


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Like his reflections on desire, Bataille’s Real occupies the symbolic realm:

the eye, the egg, the testoid oval, the language of the summit, the peak.


And we will always be told that no matter the level of violence/violation there are no crimes at stake. Women when they are not the beloved are prostitutes who exist to be observed, a temporary marriage as Nietzsche once suggested: the bride for the evening, in tatters,
i.e., or otherwise said: she needs the money and can be had.

Bataille collapses whores utterly, reduces them to their being as object for a subject. This even Sartre does not do and Sartre reminds us that public consensus and demand stands on the other side of bad faith. He is at pains to underscore the illusion as a playing at: “the waiter in the cafe plays with his condition in order to realize it. This obligation is not different from that which is imposed on all tradesmen.” [Sartre, Being and Nothingness]

And here we can add prostitutes to the mix as so many tradeswomen and tradesmen. Far from straining the point, the introduction of sex workers illuminates Sartre’s argument:

Their condition is wholly one of ceremony. The public demands of them that they realize it as a ceremony; there is the dance of the grocer, of the tailor, of the auctioneer, by which they endeavor to persuade their clientele that they are nothing but a grocer, an auctioneer, a tailor. A grocer who dreams is offensive to the buyer, because such a grocer is not wholly a grocer. [Sartre, Being and Nothingness]

A prostitute who dreams or is otherwise distracted is not wholly a prostitute as much as she will seem like the wife or the beloved.

Heaven forbid.


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